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TRUE EQUALITY FOR BATrERED WOMEN:
THE USE OF SELF-DEFENSE IN COLORADO
INTRODUCTION
Statistics regarding the frequency and severity with which women
are abused by their mates1 fill the media.2 Until recently, American so-
ciety accepted spousal abuse,3 and the legal system protected husbands
who beat their wives because it defined wife abuse as a marital right or
privilege.4 Today, although our society no longer condones or encour-
ages spousal abuse, battered women must overcome substantial obsta-
cles to remove themselves from abusive relationships. 5 In many
instances, when abused women fight back, their batterers kill them.
Intra-familial homicides accounted for nearly one-fourth of all homi-
cides in 1984, and in two-thirds of these deaths, husbands killed their
1. This Note focuses on women who are repeatedly abused by husbands or boy-
friends, but that does not diminish the fact that men can be the victims of battering rela-
tionships and face similar barriers to asserting self-defense claims.
2. See, e.g., Sara L. Johann & Frank Osanka, "I Didn't Mean to Kill Him!" 14 BARRIS-
TER Fall 1987, at 19-20 ("Estimates of battered women in the United States range from
two million to 40 million, with only twenty-five percent of all wife beatings reported to
police."); Walter W. SteeleJr. & Christine W. Sigman, Reexamining the Doctrine of Self Defense
to Accommodate Battered Women, 18 AM. J. CRIM. L. 169 n.2 (1991) ("Every 15 seconds a
woman is beaten, and more than 2,000 women are murdered each year by husbands and
boyfriends.").
The realities of abuse are not confined to the United States. A woman in Great Brit-
ain, recently convicted of killing her abusive husband, was granted a new trial by the Brit-
ish Court of Appeals in order to present new evidence regarding her state of mind at the
time of the murder. Frances Gibb, Battered Wife Who Set Fire to Husband Wins Right to Retrial,
THE TIMES (London), Aug. 1, 1992, Home News Section.
Battering often continues while the woman is pregnant. A March of Dimes study esti-
mates that domestic violence is the leading cause of birth defects, more than all other
medical causes combined. Stan Grossfeld, 'Safer' and injaik Women Who Kill Their Batterers;
Love and Terror, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 2, 1991, at 1.
3. Natalie L. Clark, Crime Begins at Home: Let's Stop Punishing Victims and Perpetrating
Violence, 28 WM. & MARY L. REv. 263, 264 (1987).
4. As far back as the Middle Ages, society condoned wife beatings. In fact, United
States and British courts acknowledged that the husband had a right to beat his wife in the
early nineteenth century. LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 11-12 (1979). As
recently as the 1970s, a field study revealed that men are much more reluctant to intervene
in a physical altercation between a man and a woman than in altercations between two men
or between two women. KATHLEEN H. HOFELLER, BATrERED WOMEN, SHATTERED LIVES 67
(1983). Police response to "domestic" disturbances reflects this reluctance as well. See id.
at 70-73.
5. Seven out of ten battered women are routinely turned away from shelters. 20/20:
Pushed to the Edge (ABC television broadcast, Sept. 17, 1991) transcript at 7 (transcript
available from Journal Graphics, Inc.). Friends, relatives and clergy often encourage bat-
tered spouses to stay with the abuser. Frances, who has been sentenced to fifteen years to
life for killing her abusive husband of almost fifty years, was advised by her pastor to "give
him lots of loving and he'll be alright." Id. at 6. Separation, divorce and restraining or-
ders are not enough to stop some cases of abuse. Tracey Thurman left her husband,
moved to another state, filed for divorce, and had restraining orders in hand when her
husband beat and stabbed her severely; she is now permanently paralyzed. Id. at 4.
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wives. 6 Statistics show that thirty-one percent of all female homicide
victims in 1988 were slain by their husbands or boyfriends. 7 However,
women who successfully fend off their abusers and must kill to protect
themselves from further harm8 are frequently charged with manslaugh-
ter or murder.9 Prosecutors often characterize these women as cold-
blooded killers seeking revenge or life insurance proceeds.10 Seventy to
seventy-five percent of them are either convicted or plead guilty to a
lesser charge. 1 Typically, battered women who kill their abusers do not
deny committing the act but claim they acted in self-defense.1 2 How-
ever, unless the woman kills her batterer during a battering incident, her
action does not fit the traditional concept of self-defense.' 3 Common
misconceptions about battered women 14 as well as a male bias in inter-
preting the reasonableness standard for self-defense' 5 often bar the bat-
6. See Angela Browne, Family Homicide: When Victimized Women Kill, HANDBOOK OF FAM-
ILY VIOLENCE 275 (Vincent B. Van Hasselt et al. eds., 1988).
7. See FBI, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES, CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES 13 (1988).
8. It is estimated that between 800 and 1,200 women a year kill men they say abuse
them. Robert Cross, Burning Issues-Threat of Death Penalty Ignites Controversy, CHI. TRIB.,
Sept. 29, 1991, at 1.
9. See, e.g., People v. Yaklich, 833 P.2d 758 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991); Browne, supra note
6, at 275.
10. See, e.g., Nancy Montgomery, Women Who Kill Abusers Face a Skeptical System, SEAT-
TLE TIMES, May 6, 1991, at A4 (defense attorneyJohn Henry Browne, stating that evidence
of a past abusive relationship gives the prosecution a motive for the killing); Susan
Paterno, A Legacy of Violence; The Courts Say They Are Killers But They Say They Were Abused And
Had No Other Way Out, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1991, at El (detailing the story of Susan Busta-
mante, whom prosecutors claimed killed her husband for a $50,000 insurance payoff). An-
gela Browne, however, notes that "women charged with the death of a mate have the least
extensive criminal records of any female offenders." Browne, supra note 6, at 275. Ac-
cording to FBI statistics, fewer men are charged with first or second degree murder than
women who kill a man they have known, and the prison sentences the women receive are
frequently longer. Id.
11. See Cross, supra note 8, at 1.
12. See CHARLES P. EWING, BATTERED WOMEN WHO KILL41 (1987); Regina A. Schuller
& Neil Vidmar, Battered Woman Syndrome Evidence in the Courtroom, 16 LAw & HUM. BEHAV.
273, 275 (1992). Battered women typically state that their only choices were to kill or be
killed. See EWING, supra, at 12-13; MJ. Willoughby, Rendering Each Woman Her Due: Can a
Battered Woman Claim Self-Defense When She Kills Her Sleeping Batterer?, 38 U. KAN. L. REV. 169,
171 (1989).
13. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AuSTIN W. Sco-r,JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 2d ed.
§ 53, at 391 (1972) (self-defense justification is premised on the principle "that one who is
unlawfully attacked by another, and who has no opportunity to resort to the law for his
defense, should be able to take reasonable steps to defend himself.").
14. Such misconceptions include the belief that women are masochistic and actually
enjoy being beaten, that they purposely provoke their husbands into violent behavior, and
that if the beatings were severe, they would leave their abusers. See WALKER, supra note 4,
at 19-31.
15. Traditionally, the rules governing self-defense were oriented towards situations
such as two men fighting in a bar. Self-defense was designed to apply to "single incidents
of violence among strangers," not complex, ongoing issues of family violence. Montgom-
ery, supra note 10, at A4. Susan Paterno stated:
The law on self-defense assumes a fight between two men of the same size and
strength, where the killer uses only as much force as the victim. If a woman
shoots a man while he has his hands around her neck, she can be-and has
been-convicted of murder.
Paterno, supra note 10, at El.
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tered woman from successfully raising the defense. 16
The judicial system lacks uniformity in dealing with women who kill
their abusers when a contemporaneous assault by the abuser is absent.
Some prosecutors and courts never charge battered women, while
others charge them with crimes ranging from first-degree murder to
manslaughter. Of those convicted, the sentences are equally as varied. 17
In addition, commentators 18 and courts advance different theories on
how the legal system should treat battered women who kill their abus-
ers. Some courts 19 and scholars20 remain steadfast in the idea that
these women are able to leave their abusive environment, so the legal
system should treat them as it would any murderer. Focusing on legal
defenses to murder, other courts advance non-traditional or innovative
theories ofjustification or excuse including (1) the battered woman de-
fense,2 1 (2) a "reasonable woman" standard for evaluating self-de-
fense,2 2 and (3) a completely subjective evaluation of the reasonableness
of self-defense.
23
However, developing new legal theories to deal with women who
kill their abusers only reinforces the idea that they acted in a manner
unacceptable to the legal system. In other words, the system does not
believe that they acted in self-defense. As this Note will argue, these
women are acting in self-defense when they kill their abusers, and their
conduct should be justified-not excused.
24
16. Approximately 2,000 women are in prison for killing their batterers. Grossfeld,
supra note 2, at 1. Forty percent of the women currently on death row are there for killing
their abuser. Cross, supra note 8, at 1.
17. Willoughby, supra note 12, at 171-73.
18. See generally EWING, supra note 12, at 77-94 (proposing a legal theory of "psycho-
logical self-defense").
19. See People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (self-defense was not
proper in a case where the defendant killed the victim while his back was turned); State v.
Stewart, 763 P.2d 572 (Kan. 1988) (implicitly deciding that defendant planned murder
because husband was asleep when she killed him); State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C.
1989).
20. See, e.g.,James R. Acker & Hans Toch, Battered Women, Straw Men, and Expert Testi-
mony: A Comment on State v. Kelly, 21 Crim. L. Bull. 125, 146-51 (1985) (suggesting that
evidence of Battered Spouse Syndrome may lead juries to believe the killing was just);
Marilyn H. Mitchell, Note, Does WifeAbuseJustify Homicide, 24 Wayne L. Rev. 1705, 1715-16
(1978) (observing that acquittals of abused wives may sanction retaliation and revenge).
21. See Cathryn J. Rosen, The Excuse of Self-Defense: Correcting a Historical Accident on Be-
half of Battered Women Who Kill, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 11, 32-33 (1986) (advocating the creation
of the "Battered Woman's Defense").
22. See generally Kim L. Scheppele, The Reasonable Woman, in THE RESPONSIBLE COMMU-
NrrY 36 (Fall 1991) (advocating the adoption of a separate reasonableness standard for
women because human perceptions regarding any event are colored by the persons'
gender).
23. See State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811 (N.D. 1983) (applying a subjective evalua-
tion of reasonableness).
24. Alternative established defenses for these murders are diminished capacity and
temporary insanity. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-8-102 (West 1990) (defining diminished
capacity as a severely abnormal mental condition which impairs understanding of reality);
Id. § 16-8-101 (West 1990) (defining insanity as being incapable of distinguishing right
from wrong). Both of these are based on the mental state of the defendant resulting from
the years of abuse. I have chosen not to address these defenses because they excuse,
rather than justify, the woman's actions by labelling her as mentally deficient.
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This Note focuses on how the legal system, when dealing with a
battered woman who kills her abuser during a lull in the violence, can
use Colorado's self-defense statute and rules of evidence to provide
equality for battered women. Self-defense statutes already in existence,
with subjective and objective elements, can and should allow these wo-
men to defend their actions. The only difference between traditional
self-defense and a battered woman raising the defense should be the
admission of expert testimony on the Battered Spouse Syndrome to ed-
ucate jurors of the realities of the defendant's life with the victim. Part I
of the Note deals with the historical theories for justifying punishment
of criminals, the development of the law of self-defense and the admissi-
bility and use of expert testimony concerning Battered Spouse Syn-
drome. It also gives an overview of how other jurisdictions handle the
self-defense claims of battered women and examines the current state of
the law concerning battered women in Colorado. Lastly, Part II of the
Note analyzes the use of self-defense by battered women and how Colo-
rado courts should address this subject using the state's current self-
defense statute and rules of evidence.
I. BACKGROUND
Courts have wrestled with the propriety of battered women self-de-
fense claims for decades 25 and have failed to reach an agreement as to
whether a battered woman should receive a jury instruction on self-de-
fense.2 6 Additionally, most battered women first encounter the judicial
system after they kill their abusive mates. 27 Whether these women
should be punished for killing their abusers is another unresolved issue.
A. Theories of Punishment
The law punishes certain behavior for various reasons: deterrence
(both general and particular), incapacitation, rehabilitation and retribu-
tion.2 8 Under the deterrence theory, the defendant's punishment is in-
tended to discourage both the general public and the defendant from
committing the same (or similar) crimes in the future.2 9 Punishment
25. See, e.g., State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989) (court refused self-defense
instruction on the grounds that the defendant shot husband while he slept); State v. Lan-
drum, 113 N.E.2d 705 (Ohio Ct. App. 1953) (wife claimed self-defense in the murder of
her abusive husband even though she planned the killing).
26. Several courts have held that the defendant is entitled to a self-defense instruction
and that expert testimony on the Battered Spouse Syndrome is admissible. See, e.g., State
v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1984); Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811 (adopting a purely subjective
test of reasonableness for self-defense); State v. Gallegos, 719 P.2d 1268 (N.M. Ct. App.
1986); State v. Allery, 682 P.2d 312 (Wash. 1984). Other courts have held the defendant
was not entitled to a self-defense instruction because there was no evidence of a threat of
imminent harm, therefore belief in imminent harm was not objectively reasonable, making
expert testimony on the Battered Spouse Syndrome irrelevant. See, e.g., People v. Aris,
264 Cal. Rptr. 167 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572 (Kan. 1988); State
v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989).
27. See Grossfeld, supra note 2, at 1.
28. LAFAVE & Sco-r, supra note 13, § 5, at 22-26.
29. Id.
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used as a particular or special deterrent discourages the individual from
committing the same crime again. According to the theory, criminal
punishment of a woman who kills her batterer will reduce the likelihood
of it happening again because during incarceration the woman will not
be in a position to engage in spousal homicide. The punishment will
also teach the battered woman that spousal homicide is counter-produc-
tive.30 In addition, general deterrence uses the wrongdoer as an exam-
ple to society so that others will refrain from similar behavior for fear of
arrest, conviction and imprisonment. The theory also contemplates that
if the battered woman knows that killing her abuser will not result in
punishment, she has less incentive to avoid using deadly force against
the batterer.31 The theory of incapacitation rests on the idea that pun-
ishment protects the rest of society from the criminal's dangerous
propensities,3 2 while retribution is premised on the idea that wrongdo-
ers should suffer for the harms they caused by being incarcerated or
punished by the legal system.33 Rehabilitation rests on the idea that
criminal anti-social behavior stems from an identifiable cause that thera-




Self-defense developed in an era when men executed the laws and
women were possessory interests of their fathers or husbands. A mascu-
line model necessarily developed.3 5 In describing self-defense cases,
one commentator stated that "familiar images of self-defense are a sol-
dier, a man protecting his home, family, or the chastity of his wife, or a
man fighting off an assailant."3 6 At that point in time, society charged
men with responsibility for the actions of their wives and daughters and
it followed that society expected men to protect and defend women.
3 7
Therefore, the doctrine of self-defense, from its inception, did not take
into account the possibility of a woman defending herself, especially
against a man.
3 8
The traditional concept of self-defense centered on two men of
equal strength and size engaged in a one-time violent encounter.3 9 It
did not account for the cumulative effects of repeated violence.40 In
order to raise the traditional defense, the defendant must show that he
reasonably feared for his life, that the peril was imminent and that the
30. See EWING, supra note 12, at 88.
31. d at 86.
32. Id.
33. LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 13, § 5, at 24.
34. Id. at 23.
35. See Steele & Sigman, supra note 2, at 175.
36. ELIZABETH BOCHNAK, WOMEN'S SELF-DEFENSE CASES: THEORY AND PRACTICE 14
(1981).
37. Steele & Sigman, supra note 2, at 175.
38. Id.
39. ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATrERED WOMEN KILL 172 (1987).
40. See Steele & Sigman, supra note 2, at 176.
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force employed in defending himself was no greater than the force used
against him.4 1 The court viewed the reasonableness and imminence
standards from the perspective of a "reasonable man." This standard
incorporated the perceptions, beliefs and fears of men.42 In addition, a
non-aggressor could only use retaliatory force once the threat of harm
was immediately necessary to protect himself. Threats of violence, un-
accompanied by an overt act of the attacker, were not enough to justify
self-defense. 4 3 Courts required the defender to delay the use of force
because of the presumption that the threatened harm might not actually
occur-that the alleged attacker might be bluffing.4 4 The judicial sys-
tem developed this concept of imminence when men were the only ac-
ceptable combatants. 45 Comparable in size and strength, they could
conceivably defend themselves once a struggle began. As a result, if the
aggressor did not employ a weapon, neither could the person defending
himself.
2. Elements
Under Colorado law, a person is justified in killing another person if
he has reasonable grounds to believe and actually does believe that he is
in imminent danger of being killed or receiving great bodily injury.4 6 The
statute also requires that in order to use deadly force, the actor must
reasonably believe that a lesser degree of force is inadequate.
4 7
Neither the Colorado legislature nor case law has defined "immi-
nent" in the self-defense context.48 In People v. Brandyberry,4 9 the court
of appeals defined imminent as it appears in the "choice of evils" stat-
41. See LAFAVE & ScoTrr, supra note 13, § 61, at 454-57.
42. See Phyllis L. Crocker, The Meaning of Equality For Battered Women Who Kill in Self-
Defense, 8 HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 121, 123-25 (1985).
43. Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 497 (1896).
44. See Steele & Sigman, supra note 2, at 178-80.
45. Id. at 175.
46. The Colorado self-defense statute explains:
(1) Except as provided in subsections (2) and (3) of this section, a person is justi-
fied in using physical force upon another person in order to defend himself or a
third person from what he reasonably believes is the use or imminent use of un-
lawful physical force by that other person, and he may use a degree of force which
he reasonably believes to be necessary for that purpose.
(2) Deadly physical force may be used only if a person reasonably believes a
lesser degree of force is inadequate and;
(a) The actor has reasonable ground to believe, and does believe, that he or an-
other person is in imminent danger of being killed or of receiving great bodily
injury....
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-704 (1986).
47. In cases involving battered women, abusers are typically much larger and stronger
than the woman. Therefore, a woman will generally be allowed to use a weapon when the
man used his hands to strangle or beat her (i.e., when he could have killed her with his
bare hands). However, this physical difference may not help the battered woman's defense
if the court believes that she should have, and could have, resorted to non-violent means
of avoiding the confrontation, like police intervention or domestic violence counselling.
Kerry A. Shad, State v. Norman: Self-Defense Unavailable to Battered Women Who Kill Passive
Abusers, 68 N.C. L. REv. 1159, 1164-65 & n.37 (1990).
48. See People v. Yaklich, 833 P.2d 758, 760 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991).
49. 812 P.2d 674 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990).
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ute 50 as "near at hand, impending or on the point of happening."5' An-
other definition of imminence appears in the Model Penal Code at
section 3.04. That section expands the imminence requirement to in-
clude an action "immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting
himself... on the present occasion." '5 2 Because the key to resolving the
self-defense problems for battered women turns on whether the
threatened action comes within the definition of "imminent danger,"
58
cases from other jurisdictions are instructive.
In State v. Gallegos,54 the New Mexico Court of Appeals examined a
self-defense claim by a battered woman. New Mexico's self-defense stat-
ute is similar to Colorado's in that they both require an honest belief
and an objectively reasonable belief in imminent (or immediate) dan-
ger.5 5 The court held imminence does not require actual physical as-
sault, and "threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the
required imminence of danger." 5 6 To support that conclusion, the
court recognized that incidents of domestic violence tend to follow pre-
dictable patterns and that certain remarks or gestures, although mean-
ingless to the average member of the public, may be understood by the
abused person as an affirmation and indication of impending abuse.
5 7
New Mexico's interpretation of immediate harm or death is much
more expansive than some other states.58 In People v. Aris,59 for exam-
ple, the California Supreme Court employed a much stricter definition.
The court held imminent danger requires "a demonstration of an imme-
diate intention to execute the threat .... A previous threat alone, unac-
companied by any immediate demonstration of force.., will not justify
50. COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-1-702 (1986) (conduct which would otherwise constitute a
crime is justifiable if the actor engages in such conduct, under extraordinary circum-
stances, out of necessity to prevent greater harm from occurring).
51. Brandybeny, 812 P.2d at 678 (quoting BLACK's LAw DICTiONARY 676 (5th ed.
1979)).
52. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (1985). See also B. Sharon Byrd, Till Death Do Us
Part: A Comparative Law Approach to Justifying Lethal Self-Defense by Battered Women, 1 DUKEJ.
COMP. & INT'L L. 169, 172-73 (1991). Although the Colorado General Assembly has not
specifically embraced the Model Penal Code (MPC), it did recodify the state's criminal laws
following the appearance of the Model Penal Code in 1971. People v.Jefferson, 748 P.2d
1223, 1228 (Colo. 1988). In specific areas, the Colorado courts have adopted the MPC
interpretations. Id. at 1228 (recognizing that the "extreme indifference" to murder statute
applied the MPC's four levels of culpability); People v. Merrill, 687 P.2d 443, 446 (Colo.
1984) (finding that the statute on resisting arrest abrogated the common law right to use
reasonable force to resist an unlawful arrest).
53. See People v. Yaklich, 833 P.2d 758, 762 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991).
54. 719 P.2d 1268 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986).
55. New Mexico requires that the person claiming self-defense subjectively believe
that he or she is in immediate danger of death or great bodily harm and that belief must be
objectively reasonable. Id. at 1270-71.
56. Id. at 1271.
57. Id.
58. Those states that exclude Battered Spouse Syndrome testimony do so on the
premise that imminent danger means that there is no escaping the harm; it will occur
immediately. See People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167 (Cal. App. 1989); State v. Stewart, 763
P.2d 572 (Kan. 1988); State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989).
59. 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 172-73 (1989).
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or excuse an assault ... .",60 The court concluded there was "no evi-
dence of any reasonable indication in the sleeping victim's behavior that
he was about to attempt to harm the defendant," 6 1 and therefore, the
defendant was not entitled to receive a self-defense instruction. The
policy reasons behind the court's decision included the belief that a bat-
tered woman must look to other means provided by her family, friends
and society to resolve her problems. The court refused to accept that
killing her husband was an appropriate alternative. 6 2 The North Caro-
lina Supreme Court, in State v. Norman, applied a similar definition of
imminent to deny the defendant a self-defense instruction.65 There, the
court applied the traditional policy reasoning and said the defendant
must be faced with an instantaneous choice between killing her husband
or being killed or seriously injured to satisfy the imminence
requirement.6 4
In order to claim self-defense, a defendant's fear regarding immi-
nent danger of death or great bodily harm must be both honest and
reasonable. 6 5 Honesty focuses on the defendant's subjective state of
mind. Did the defendant actually believe she was in danger of death or
great bodily harm? Reasonableness, however, is an objective determina-
tion. Given the same set of circumstances, would an ordinary, prudent
person have believed that her life was in imminent danger? The objec-
tive determination is necessary to prevent people from acting on irra-
tional or unreasonable fears.
C. Battered Spouse Syndrome
1. Definition
The Battered Spouse Syndrome, developed by Dr. Lenore
Walker,6 6 provides a framework for assessing the abused woman's be-
havior. The syndrome consists of a three-phase cycle. During the first
phase, the "tension building" phase, the male verbally abuses the wo-
man and engages in minor battering.6 7 The woman often attempts to
placate her batterer by giving in to his demands, agreeing with him in an
argument or submitting to the abuse in order to stave off more intense
violence.6 8 The second phase, the "acute battering" phase, is most
often triggered by some event in the life of the battering male. This is
when the woman sustains the most severe injuries, including broken
60. Id at 173.
61. Id. at 176.
62. Id. at 174.
63. 378 S.E.2d 8, 12 (N.C. 1989), rev g 366 S.E.2d 586 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988).
64. Id. at 13.
65. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-704(2)(a) (1986).
66. See generally WALKER, supra note 4. Prior to Dr. Walker's published studies of bat-
tered women, Del Martin explored the common traits and problems facing battered wo-
men. Although the terminology "Battered Spouse Syndrome" was not used, Martin's
observations and conclusions conform with Dr. Walker's theory. See generally DEL MARTIN,
BA-rrERED WIVES(1976).
67. WALKER, supra note 4, at 56-59.
68. Id.
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bones, concussions, lacerations or even death.69 In the final phase, the
"contrition" phase, the batterer pleads for forgiveness and vows never
to do it again. This phase reinforces the woman's desire to believe that
her marriage/relationship is worth saving.70 The woman often feels
partially responsible for the battering incident, thinking it was some-
thing she did or said, or even believing her abuser was right to be angry
with her. This acceptance of the blame makes it easier for her to take
the batterer back. As time goes on and the cycle is repeated, the period
of time between the acute batterings gets shorter and shorter. Accord-
ing to Dr. Walker, a woman is a victim of the Battered Spouse Syndrome
when the cycle of violence occurs twice.
7 1
2. Use of Expert Testimony
Expert testimony72 'about the Battered Spouse Syndrome serves
two purposes. First, it dispels common myths about battered women.
Second, it provides the jury with some insight into the practical realities
of life as a battered woman so that the jury can assess her actions from
her perspective. The testimony is not supposed to justify the woman's
behavior, rather, it should serve as background information used to as-
sess the reasonableness of the defendant's belief that death or great
bodily harm is imminent. The expert provides a sense that the woman's
belief was reasonable, both objectively and subjectively. Consequently,
the expert's testimony is more persuasive than the defendant's own tes-
timony regarding the cycle of abuse.
Aside from offering testimony about the cyclical nature of the vio-
lence as mentioned above, the expert's testimony also focuses on the
other aspects of the syndrome that help explain why the battered woman
stayed with her abuser. 73 This type of testimony is essential to combat
the common myth that battered women choose to stay with their abusive
mates. The expert can explain that these women often do not have al-
ternatives and, at some level, do not want to see the relationship end.
After all, the entire relationship was not abusive and the contrition
phase provides hope that the abuse will stop. The expert can also offer
69. Id. at 59-65.
70. Id. at 65-70.
71. Id. at xv. The abuse does not always have to be physical. The batterer maintains
control over the woman through verbal and psychological abuse as well. Belittling and
degrading comments reinforce feelings of insecurity in the woman, and the batterer uses
that insecurity to keep the woman from asserting her independence.
72. According to Charles Ewing, the expert's testimony has two main components.
First, the expert describes the syndrome and explains the three-stage cycle. Then, the
expert describes how the abuse escalates as the cycle is repeated as well as the psychologi-
cal consequences of repeated abuse, such as depression, learned helplessness and false
hope that the batterer will change. The expert then explains how these consequences and
economic and social factors prevent the abused woman from leaving. Second, the expert
indicates whether the defendant suffered from the syndrome and explains how her exper-
iences with the batterer affected her perceptions and behavior at the time of the killing. See
EWING, supra note 12, at 51-52.
73. See Shad, supra note 47, at 1167 & n.61 (discussing the dynamics of a battering
relationship and feelings of helplessness associated with repeated violence).
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evidence that most of these women suffer from low self-esteem, possess
traditional beliefs in their role as a wife and mother, have tremendous
feelings of guilt that the relationship is failing and accept responsibility
for the batterer's actions. 74 These characteristics also help combat the
lay-person's perceptions that the abused woman consciously chose to
stay with the batterer.
D. Self-Defense Claims of Battered Women Who Kill Their Abusers in Other
Jurisdictions
The battered woman who kills her abuser usually does so in one of
three ways: (1) she hires a third person to kill the abuser, (2) she kills the
abuser when he is physically attacking her, or (3) she kills the abuser
during a lull in the violence or immediately following the violence.
75
Courts that address the situation where the defendant hires someone to
kill her batterer consistently refuse to instruct the jury on self-defense.
76
On the other hand, virtually all jurisdictions allow a self-defense instruc-
tion when the defendant kills her abuser at the moment of a physical
attack.7 7 However, when faced with the third scenario-the woman who
kills her abuser during a lull in the violence-the availability of a self-
defense instruction depends on state interpretations of the defense.
Scholarly debate78 and judicial scrutiny79 focus on the use of self-de-
fense and expert testimony in these types of cases. The following illus-
trates the different approaches courts use to resolve the self-defense
claims of these women.
The North Carolina Supreme Court, in State v. Norman,80 reversed
the court of appeals' decision that allowed the defendant to introduce
testimony on the Battered Spouse Syndrome and proffer a self-defense
instruction to the jury on remand. The heinous abuse to which Mrs.
Norman was subjected for almost twenty-five years parallels that of a
prisoner of war.8 1 Yet, the court found that she was not entitled to a
74. State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 372 (N.J. 1984) (referring to WALKER, supra note 4, at
35-36). However, a woman does not need to exhibit all of these characteristics to be a
victim of abuse.
75. People v. Yaklich, 833 P.2d 758, 761 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991).
76. Id. at 763 (citing State v. Anderson, 758 S.W.2d 596 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); State v.
Martin, 666 S.W.2d 895 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Leaphart, 673 S.W.2d 870 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1983)).
77. Id. at 761 (referring to State v. Hundley, 693 P.2d 475 (Kan. 1985)) (victim was
shot during a abusive incident).
78. See generally Byrd, supra note 52; Steele & Sigman, supra note 2; Willoughby, supra
note 12.
79. The states which have addressed the use of Battered Spouse Syndrome testimony
to support a self-defense claim include Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana,
Maine, New Jersey, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, New Mex-
ico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Washington, Wyoming, and the District of
Columbia. Cynthia L. Coffee, A Trend Emerges: A State Survey on the Admissability of Expert
Testimony Concerning the Battered Woman Syndrome, 25 J. FAM. L. 373 (1987).
80. 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989).
81. See Byrd, supra note 52, at 169-71 (comparing Judith Norman's experience to that
of a POW). Judith Norman's husband denied her food, beat, kicked and prostituted her.
In addition, on various occasions he crushed glass in her face, put cigarettes out on her
body and poured boiling liquids over her. Id. For a parallel discussion analogizing the
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self-defense instruction because she shot her husband while he slept.
On the day of the murder, Mr. Norman beat the defendant the en-
tire day and made her lie on the floor like a dog while he slept on the
bed. The defendant testified that the abuse had escalated in the two
days preceding his death and that she had to kill him. She "knew" that
when he woke up the abuse would start again, she could not take it any-
more, and she was too afraid of him to press charges or leave. 82 How-
ever, the supreme court stated that because the defendant was not faced
with the "instantaneous choice between killing her husband or being
killed or seriously injured," there was no imminent danger.83 Accord-
ing to the court, the defendant's subjective belief, no matter how honest,
could not overcome the absence of an objectively reasonable belief that
the danger was imminent. The court also expressed a deep concern that
allowing self-defense instructions in cases where the abused person kills
during a lull in the violence would legalize the "opportune killing of
abusive husbands . . .solely on the basis of the wives' testimony con-
cerning their subjective speculation as to the probability of future feloni-
ous assaults by their husbands."
'8 4
The California Court of Appeals, in People v. Aris,85 held that the
trial court erred in omitting testimony about the Battered Spouse Syn-
drome and how years of abuse affected the defendant's state of mind at
the time of the killing. However, the court found the error harmless
because the defendant was not in imminent danger at the time of the
killing. The defendant's marriage to the victim, marred by years of
abuse, ended when she fatally shot him while he slept.8 6 On the evening
of the killing, the husband severely beat the defendant and, prior to fall-
ing asleep, warned her that he did not know if he would let her live until
the morning. The defendant testified that she felt she had to kill him
before he awoke because she feared that he would carry out his threat.
87
The court, sympathetic to the defendant's plight, stated that a valid self-
defense claim requires an honest belief that the defendant is in immi-
nent danger. Previous threats alone did not satisfy the imminence re-
quirement, unless the abuser couples those threats with an apparent
design at the same moment to carry them out, because the person who
made the threats could always abandon his intent to make good on the
them. 88 Lastly, the court stated that it could not excuse the defendant's
crime merely because walking-away from the sleeping victim would not
effects of the Thomas/Hill hearings on women with POW treatment, see Penelope E.
Bryan, Holding Women's Psyches Hostage: An Interpretive Analogy on the Thomas/Hill Hearings, 69
DENV. U. L. REv. 2 (1992).
82. Norman, 378 S.E.2d at 11 (the progressive nature of his abuse would inevitably
lead to her death).
83. Id at 14.
84. Id. at 15.
85. 264 Cal. Rptr. 167 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
86. See Paterno, supra note 10, at El (detailing the events leading up to the abuser's
death).
87. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
88. Id. at 174.
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avoid future confrontations. The court explained that a battered spouse
must look to other means of protecting herself, such as family, friends, a
restraining order or a shelter. Although dicta, the court did find the
defendant was entitled to introduce evidence of the Battered Spouse
Syndrome to establish reasonableness.
The New Mexico Court of Appeals, in State v. Gallegos,89 adopted a
more liberal definition of imminence. Establishing self-defense in New
Mexico requires (1) the danger of death or serious bodily harm must
appear imminent to the defendant, (2) the defendant must actually be in
fear of that danger and (3) the defendant must act as a reasonable per-
son would act in the same circumstances. 90 The court stated that "[t]he
defendant must show that she was in fear of an apparent or immediate
danger . . . [but] need not prove that she was in actual danger." 9 1 In
addition, the court found the subjective perceptions of an individual
brutalized by domestic violence were especially critical to the determina-
tion of whether her actions were reasonable. However, the court made
it clear that evidence of a violent relationship is not sufficient alone to
give a self-defense instruction to the jury. Prior to the battered woman
defendant's use of force, the abuser-victim must exhibit some threaten-
ing behavior.
9 2
The case of State v. Leidholm9 3 represents the most liberal approach
to battered women who kill their abusers. Mrs. Leidholm ended her tu-
multuous and abusive marriage by stabbing her husband to death with a
butcher knife while he slept. The defendant and victim fought for sev-
eral hours on the evening of the killing. At one point, Mrs. Leidholm
attempted to call the police, but her husband prevented her from using
the phone. After he went to sleep, the defendant took a butcher knife
and stabbed him several times. At her trial, Mrs. Leidholm claimed she
acted in self-defense as a result of years of abuse,9 4 but she was nonethe-
less convicted of manslaughter. On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme
Court reversed the trial court's conviction and adopted an entirely sub-
jective test for the reasonableness of the defendant's belief in the immi-
nence of death or serious bodily harm. Based on North Dakota's self-
defense statutes, 9 5 the court held that if the defendant has an honest
belief that she is in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm,
the question of self-defense can be put to the jury.96 The court also
held that the defendant can use expert testimony on the Battered
Spouse Syndrome to support her theory of self-defense because such
testimony allows the jury to evaluate the defendant's self-defense claim
from her perspective.
97
89. 719 P.2d 1268 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986).
90. Id. at 1270.
91. Id. at 1271.
92. Id.
93. 334 N.W.2d 811 (N.D. 1983).
94. Id. at 814.
95. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-05-03 (1988).
96. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d at 818-19.
97. Id. at 819.
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E. Colorado Cases Involving Battered Women
Colorado appellate courts have decided two cases in which the de-
fendant claimed to have killed her abusive mate while acting in self-de-
fense: People v. Yaklich 98 and People v. Hare.99 Although neither case
presented a scenario in which the woman killed her abuser during a lull
in the violence, a brief description of each case is helpful in understand-
ing the current state of the law in Colorado.
In Yaklich, the defendant Donna Yaklich, hired two men to kill her
husband, Dennis, following years of abuse. 10 0 Whenever she tried to
leave him, he would threaten to kill her or a member of her family. In
constant fear for her life and believing that Dennis could kill her and get
away with it,' ° 1 Donna arranged to have her husband killed. On Decem-
ber 12, 1985, Edward and Charles Greenwell shot and killed Dennis
Yaklich in the driveway of his home. Following the murder, Donna paid
the Greenwells $4,200. 102 The police charged Donna Yaklich with first-
degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder. The prosecution
maintained that the proceeds from her husband's $250,000 life insur-
ance policy and revenge for the years of abuse motivated Yaklich to ar-
range her husband's death.' 0 3 Donna, on the other hand, maintained
that she killed her husband in self-defense.10 4 The trial court allowed
Donna's attorney to introduce evidence that Donna was a victim of the
Battered Spouse Syndrome and tendered instructions to the jury con-
cerning self-defense, duress and apparent necessity. The jury acquitted
Yaklich of the murder charges, but convicted her of conspiracy to com-
mit first-degree murder and sentenced her to forty years in prison. 0 5
The prosecution appealed the propriety of the trial court's self-de-
98. 833 P.2d 758 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991) (defendant hired two men to kill her abusive
husband).
99. 782 P.2d 831 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989) (defendant killed abusive live-in boyfriend
while struggling over a gun) aff'd 800 P.2d 1317 (Colo. 1990).
100. The events leading up to the murder are important in understanding Donna's
self-defense claim. During her eight-year marriage to Dennis, Donna suffered physical and
emotional abuse at the hands of her husband. Her husband often used steroids, which
increased his violent nature. Various episodes of abuse included pushing her down a flight
of stairs, choking her, aiming a gun at her, repeatedly beating her head against a window,
kicking her and threatening to kill her and members of her family. In addition, Dennis
required Donna to be awake and dressed when he came home from work at three or four
in the morning with a meal prepared for him. She had to stay awake and carry on a con-
versation with him and listen to his constant belittling and degrading comments about her.
After slapping her around, Dennis forced sex on her but never let her sleep in the same
bed with him. Because Dennis was a police officer, Donna believed that reporting the
abuse, either to police or other authorities, would only aggravate the situation. In the
months preceding his death, the episodes of abuse and threats of death intensified. Appel-
lee's Opening Brief at 6-11, People v. Yaklich, 833 P.2d 758 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991) [herein-
after Opening Brief].
101. Id. at 16-17.
102. She paid the brothers over a period of weeks following the murder and subse-
quent funeral. Appellee's Answer Brief at 6-7, People v. Yaklich, 833 P.2d 758 (Colo. Ct.
App. 199 1) [hereinafter Answer Brief].
103. Opening Brief, supra note 100, at 1.
104. Id.
105. Yaklich, 833 P.2d at 760.
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fense instruction in a "murder-for-hire" situation. The appeals court
held that, even if the defendant presents credible evidence that she suf-
fers from the Battered Spouse Syndrome, the court cannot give a self-
defense instruction to the jury in a murder-for-hire case. 10 6 The court
gave three reasons for its holding: (1) of the other jurisdictions to con-
sider the Battered Spouse Syndrome in conjunction with a murder-for-
hire case, none have allowed a self-defense instruction, 10 7 (2) a self-de-
fense instruction in a murder-for-hire situation would undermine "an-
cient notions" of self-defense' 0 8 and (3) such a decision would establish
poor public policy because the men she hired were convicted for mur-
der.'0 9  Adopting the reasoning of the Missouri and Tennessee
courts, 10 the Colorado Court of Appeals implicitly concluded that the
defense had not presented any evidence to support the instruction, and
therefore, was not entitled to an instruction "embodying its theory of
the case.""'I  In order to reach that result, the court decided that the
defendant was not in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm
at the time of the killing, 112 but, the court refused to define "immi-
nent. " 3 The court, however, did accept the admission of the Battered
Spouse Syndrome testimony without commenting on whether it was
properly introduced or what circumstances might justify introduction of
such evidence. 14 Thus, the precedent established by People v. Yaklich is
limited to the situation where the battered spouse hires a third party to
kill her mate. 
1 15
In People v. Hare,116 the defendant shot and killed her live-in boy-
friend. The only issue on appeal was whether the judge must provide
the jury with an instruction on "apparent necessity," ' 1 7 in addition to a
106. Id.
107. Id. at 763. These courts conclude that a self-defense instruction and evidence of
Battered Spouse Syndrome in murder-for-hire cases is improper because those situations
pose no immediate or imminent danger. See State v. Anderson, 785 S.W.2d 596 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1990); State v. Martin, 666 S.W.2d 895 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Leaphart, 673
S.W.2d 870 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983).
108. Id. (citing State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989) ("The killing of another
human being is the most extreme recourse to our inherent right of self-preservation and
can be justified in law only by the utmost real or apparent necessity brought about by the
decedent.")).
109. Id.
110. State v. Anderson, 785 S.W.2d 596 (Mo. Ct. App 1990) (the fact that defendant
hired the killers does not support a self-defense claim); Missouri v. Martin, 666 S.W.2d
895 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (trial court did not err in excluding evidence of Battered Spouse
Syndrome where defendant hired a hit man); Tennessee v. Leaphart, 673 S.W.2d 870
(Tenn. Grim. App. 1983) (wife was not in immediate danger at the time husband was killed
by hired killers).
111. Yaklich, 833 P.2d at 763.
112. Donna was at home in bed when the Greenwells killed her husband. Opening
Brief, supra note 100, at 17.
113. Yaklich, 833 P.2d 758, 763.
114. Id. The court's conclusion assumed that the evidence was admissible and
credible.
115. The court specifically stated that "a self-defense instruction was not available in a
contract-for-hire situation." Id. at 760.
116. 800 P.2d 1317 (Colo. 1990).
117. Apparent necessity is the idea that the actor may act on the appearance of immi-
nent danger. The danger may not actually be real, it needs only be real to the actor. This
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self-defense instruction. Only the dissenting opinion mentioned the de-
fendant's history of abuse at the hands of her mate.' 1 8 The defendant
testified that she lived with the victim for approximately six months
before the shooting and during that time the decedent repeatedly beat,
threatened, humiliated and intimidated her.1 9 On the evening of the
shooting, the decedent threatened the defendant's life with a gun after
assaulting her. The decedent was shot during a struggle for the gun,
120
therefore, neither the supreme court nor the court of appeals addressed
the propriety of a self-defense instruction or the admissibility of Bat-
tered Spouse Syndrome testimony. Because the scenario in Hare in-
volved traditional self-defense by fulfilling the imminent danger
requirement, the court saw no reason to address the special self-defense
issues of battered women.' 21
In light of the foregoing analysis and the absence of affirmative leg-
islation on the matter, it is clear that Colorado has not yet addressed the
issue of availability of a self-defense instruction or the admissibility of
expert testimony concerning the Battered Spouse Syndrome in cases
where a woman kills her abuser. Consequently, the remainder of this
Note analyzes (1) how theories of punishment do not support punishing
battered women and (2) why courts can and should use Colorado's self-
defense statute and rules of evidence to provide equality for women who
kill their batterers during a lull in the violence.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Theories of Punishment
By punishing women who kill'their abusers, the judicial system does
not further any of the theories of punishment. First, particular deter-
rence is not served because the object of the crime, the abusive spouse,
no longer poses a threat and there is no continuing incentive for the
woman to commit the crime in the future. Even assuming she enters
into another abusive relationship, the fear of incarceration will not deter
her from killing again. In fact, the resulting economic effects of a prison
sentence may further limit her ability to extricate herself from the sec-
ond abusive relationship.1 2 2 In addition, general deterrence does not
apply to battered women, because the women who kill their batterers do
so when they believe their only options are tor "kill or be killed." 1 23 The
premise of general deterrence is that once she has killed, she poses a
threat to the community or at least to other men with whom she may
develop a relationship. The self-preservation aspect of these crimes out-
weighs any deterrent effect of punishment. A battered woman, on the
concept is also termed "the right to be wrong." People v. Hare, 782 P.2d 831, 833 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1989).
118. Id. at 833 (Dubofsky, J. dissenting).
119. Id. at 831, 833.
120. Id. at 831.
121. Id. at 833.
122. See EWING, supra note 12, at 88-89.
123. Willoughby, supra note 12, at 171.
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brink of using deadly force, in all likelihood will not stop and ponder the
consequences of her actions. As an inmate in the Framingham Correc-
tional Institution in Massachusetts explained, "it's not something that
happens overnight, like, my boyfriend slapped me, so I killed him. This
is years of abuse-mental, physical, all kinds." 124 Even if she does stop
to consider the consequences, the resulting conclusion will likely be that
the benefits of killing-specifically preservation of her life-will out-
weigh the costs. 12 5 Incapacitation is also not a suitable motive for pun-
ishing these women because the objects of their violent acts, the
decedents, no longer pose threats. Therefore, the risk of harm to others
is minimal. Similarly, rehabilitation as a means of reforming the crimi-
nal 126 does not serve a useful purpose in the battered-woman context.
The criminal will not likely kill again because the situation precipitating
the crime no longer exists.
The only theory of punishment that might fit this situation is retri-
bution. However, this theory is not persuasive in the context of women
who, as a last resort, strike out against their abusers. The women serv-
ing time for killing their abusers feel much freer in jail than they did
while their batterers were alive. 127 In essence, their incarceration is not
nearly as punishing as the life they faced while their abusers were
alive.12 8 Somejudges, governors and congressmen believe the agony of
living in a battering relationship for any number of years is enough pun-
ishment for these women, 12 9 and retribution in the form of imprison-
ment would be redundant.
124. Grossfeld, supra note 2, at 1.
125. See EwING, supra note 12, at 86-88.
126. Id.
127. Grassfeld, supra note 2, at 1.
128. The stories recounted by these women include abusers pouring boiling water on
them, smashing their teeth out with hammers and forcibly raping them. The fear of repri-
sal from the batterer is an all-encompassing fear that is more debilitating than the fear of
incarceration. Id.
129. For example, a judge in Illinois refused to re-sentence a 61 year-old woman con-
victed of killing her abusive husband whose conviction was overturned on appeal. He
reasoned that in addition to the three and a half years she had already spent in prison, she
had served a twenty-year sentence at the hands of her late husband. Peter Kendall, Woman
Who Killed Her Husband Won't Have to Return to Prison, CHI. TIRis., Dec. 7, 1991, at D-5. See
also Grossfeld, supra note 2, at 1 ("[These women] are doubly punished. First battered by
their lover, then imprisoned by the state for defending their lives.").
Subject to severe criticism, the governors of Maryland, Ohio and Washington recently
commuted the sentences of women serving time in those states for killing their abusive
husbands. See generally Paterno, supra note 10. Governor Schaefer of Maryland commuted
the sentences of ten women because he believed that these women were "driven to vio-
lence by their abusive mates." Howard Scheider, Schaefer to Free 2 Inmates, WASH. PosT,
June 28, 1991, at B1. The governors of Illinois, New Hampshire, Louisiana, New Jersey
and Tennessee freed inmates serving sentences for killing their abusers. Texas and Flor-
ida are investigating whether to release similar prisoners. Florida Considers Clemency, USA
TODAY, Sept. 13, 1991, at 3A.
The House Judiciary subcommittee is considering a bill that would set aside $1.2 mil-
lion for research and judicial training programs involving domestic violence. Rep. Con-
stance Morella sponsored the bill because she believes that congressional support, to
broaden the defenses available to battered spouses who kill their abusers, would prompt
widespread changes in state laws. KentJenkins,Jr., Morella Bill Would Provide Aidfor Defense
of Battered Spouses, WASH. PosT, Aug. 7, 1992, at B3.
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When society punishes women who kill their abusive spouses, it
must also consider the impact on the children of these relationships.
For years, these children watched their fathers or step-fathers physically
and emotionally batter their mothers or step-mothers without the legal
system or law enforcement personnel intervening or punishing him for
his behavior. Yet when a mother fights back to protect her life and her
children's lives, that same system punishes her. Are young boys left with
the message that it is acceptable to abuse women? Are young girls left
with the idea that they must accept the beatings and cannot attempt to
fight back? If the tragedy of abuse is ever to end, society in general (and
the legal system specifically) must show children that abuse is not ac-
ceptable. Because punishing these women does not further any of the
goals of punishment, the legal system could better serve society by al-
lowing battered women to start new lives.13 0 More specifically, courts
could achieve justice for these women by allowing them to use self-
defense.
B. Self-Defense
Assumptions regarding (1) the amount of force necessary to repel
an attack, (2) the need to wait until the aggressor attacks and (3) percep-
tions of imminence associated with self-defense and forming the basis of
traditional self-defense, are unwarranted in a male-female confronta-
tion. First, the man is usually much larger and stronger than his female
counterpart. Second, considering these differences, the deadly force
employed by a battered woman would be reasonable ifjudged from her
perspective, with her physical characteristics and personal experiences
as a victim of abuse.' 3 ' Consequently, in the context of a battered wo-
man, evidence of women's perceptions and fears should be presented to
juries to counter the long-standing male bias inherent in self-defense.
The crucial aspect of self-defense for battered women is the objective rea-
sonableness of her belief that she is in imminent danger.132 Definitions of
imminent danger and reasonableness, therefore, must take into account
the circumstances surrounding the situation in order to treat women
fairly.
1. Perceptions of Imminent Danger
In general, men and women perceive danger differently. A woman
walking down a dark street with a strange car following her will fear for
her safety sooner than a man. Her perception of fear is grounded in her
physical characteristics (strength and size) and her past experiences with
danger. Therefore, it is patently unfair to judge the reasonableness of a
130. Many of the women in prison for killing their abusers are genuinely sorry they did
it-not because they have to serve time, but because they really loved the person they
killed. They say they never intended to kill the abuser but only wanted to stop the pain.
See generally Grossfeld, supra note 2; Paterno, supra note 10.
131. See Shad, supra note 47, at n.37.
132. See generally Montgomery, supra note 10, at A4.
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woman's fear that she is in imminent danger, as required for self-de-
fense, without considering the situation as she perceived it, including
her physical characteristics and past experiences.
The narrow views of North Carolina and California courts on rea-
sonableness and imminence ignore the realities of a battering situation.
From the personal experiences of the battered woman, she knows the
patterns and predispositions of the attacker. "A battered woman may
believe she is in imminent danger every moment she is in the presence
of her partner." 133 She is certain he will carry out his threats and that
the next beating will be more severe than the last. After all, he repeat-
edly beat her in the past, and the abusive episodes are escalating.'
8 4
The likelihood that the threatened harm will not occur may be minimal.
In fact, the batterer often promises that he will kill her, and she believes
him. In this type of situation, the abused woman must be prepared to
protect herself at all times, lest her abuser carry out his death threats. 13 5
"[N]ot knowing precisely when the next attack will occur is not tanta-
mount to a lack of imminent peril."' 1 6 In fact, the cyclical nature of the
abuse teaches the abused woman to recognize the signs of an impending
attack.13 7 Testimony concerning the reality of a battered woman's life
helps the jury ascertain whether her fear for her life or safety at the time
she killed her batterer was warranted. Most courts agree that expert
testimony is relevant on this issue, regardless of whether the court ac-
cepts the expert testimony to establish the objective reasonableness of
the defendant's actions.
1 38
2. Reasonableness of Belief in Imminent Danger
As previously mentioned, the definition of imminent is subject to
varying judicial interpretations; a similar split in judicial decisions
plagues the reasonableness standard. The courts that narrowly define
"imminent" also hold the defendant to a "reasonably prudent person"
133. Kathee Rebernak Brewer, Note, Missouri's New Law on "Battered Spouse Syndrome:" A
Moral Victory, A Partial Solution, 33 ST. Louis U. L.J. 227, 233 (1988).
134. Most of these women strike back when they sense their attacker may seriously
injure or kill them. There is an urgency about the situation-they know someone will die.
See, e.g., People v. Hare, 782 P.2d 831, 833 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989) (the decedent told the
defendant that "he would kill her and that one of them would not be alive in the morn-
ing.") aff'd, 800 P.2d 1317 (Colo. 1990). Aside from the barrage of death threats, exact
behavior that triggers the woman's fear of impending death is hard to pinpoint, except
that, usually, the "reign of terror" has been non-stop for the twenty-four hours preceding
the killing. See, e.g., State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989) (the abuse, which included
deprivation of food, kicking, slapping, throwing objects and putting cigarettes out on her
body, escalated over the two days preceding the killing).
135. See Steele & Sigman, supra note 2, at 179.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); See also State v. Stewart,
763 P.2d 572 (Kan. 1988) (although the court held expert testimony was inadmissible to
show the reasonableness of defendant's actions, that same testimony was relevant to judg-
ing the honesty of the defendant's belief that she was in danger); State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d
364 (N.J. 1984) (holding that the expert testimony was relevant to both the honesty and
reasonableness of belief in danger).
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or "a person of ordinary firmness" standard.'1 9 The wording of those
standards was modified in recent years to make the test gender-neutral,
however, the actual implementation of those standards is not gender-
neutral.' 40 "A man's mental perceptions of danger, immediacy, and
harm inform the perception of what constitutes a reasonable physical
response." 141
Those courts that refuse to give a self-defense instruction to the
battered-woman defendant fail to recognize that a woman's belief in
danger can still be reasonable, although it may be different because of
her experiences and size. By rejecting her claim of imminent danger,
courts perpetuate the reasonable man standard and usurp the jury's role
in deciding what is "reasonable." To hold the defendant to a standard
of whether a reasonable, non-battered person would react in an identical
manner is to judge her actions in a vacuum. Such a standard ascribes
alternatives to the battered woman that may never exist in her world.
Society, in general, believes that the battered woman can either leave or
seek police protection. These alternatives are actually quite unrealistic.
A common experience among battered women who try to leave their
mates is that they are tracked down and beaten and/or killed for at-
tempting to leave.14 2 In addition, the abuser often threatens to kill the
woman or someone she loves if she leaves. 143 Relying on the police also
proves ineffective. For years, police reluctantly got involved in domestic
disputes, and often sought a reconciliation, as opposed to an arrest.
144
However, when women call the police to arrest their mates, they often
face even more severe beatings if the husband returns home. 14 5 When
restraining orders are not enforced, and arrest warrants are not issued,
what alternatives does the battered woman have?
These misconceptions about battered women govern jurors' ideas
of reasonableness. The jurors judge the defendant's actions by a stan-
dard that accords her many more opportunities to escape than she actu-
ally had at the time. Expert testimony on the Battered Spouse
Syndrome can combat these misconceptions and inform the jury of how
the defendant perceived her situation. In State v. Kelly,14 6 the court con-
cluded that "the expert's testimony [concerning the Battered Spouse
Syndrome], if accepted by the jury, would have aided it in determining
whether, under the circumstances [i.e., the circumstances of her life, not
just at the time of the incident], a reasonable person would have be-
139. State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989) (rejecting the idea that evidence of the
battering relationship could serve as a basis for reasonable belie).
140. Crocker, supra note 42, at 126-28.
141. Id. at 127.
142. See generally Shad, supra note 47.
143. Id.
144. In Metropolitan Denver, 50%6 of the police departments use mediation or separa-
tion of the parties in response to domestic violence calls. MILE HIGH UNITED WAY RE-
SEARCH & PLANNING DEPARTMENT, SPECIAL REPORT: CRIMINALJUSTICE SYSTEM'S RESPONSE
TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE - METRo DENVER 7 (1989).
145. See Crocker, supra note 42, at 134.
146. 478 A.2d 364 (NJ. 1984).
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lieved there was imminent danger to her life." 14 7 Preventing the intro-
duction of this testimony forces the jury to judge the defendant's
reasonableness from a perspective of a non-battered person, a world to-
tally foreign to the defendant when she acted.
148
The Colorado Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "reasonable
belief rather than absolute certainty is the touchstone of self-de-
fense."' 149 In addition, the supreme court in Beckett v. People 150 held the
reasonableness of the defendant's actions must be judged from the to-
tality of circumstances. 1 5 1 A defendant is justified in self-defense if a
reasonable person, under like conditions and circumstances, would be-
lieve the use of force was necessary to prevent death or serious bodily
harm. 152 Based on these readings of the self-defense statute, a battered
woman should be entitled to have the reasonableness of her actions
judged from her perspective. The jury should be allowed to consider
her life experiences in determining whether her actions were reason-
able. The effects of such experiences are usually offered by an expert
witness.
A common myth regarding battered women is that they are all low-
income, uneducated women. However, the reality is the abusive rela-
tionship knows no class boundaries. The battering may begin with ver-
bal abuse and criticism, as well as isolation from friends and family.
Eventually the victim begins to believe she is actually a bad mother or
bad wife or stupid, leaving her with little self-confidence or self-esteem
and very few friends. 15 3 Once the physical abuse begins, her first reac-
tion is to flee. But, many have nowhere to go and fear reprisal from
their batterers if they do leave. 15 4 Leaving the batterer is often not an
option even if the woman can overcome the fear of reprisal. Typically
the husband knows where she works and can easily track her down. 155
The systematic demoralization and isolation that result from continued
physical and verbal abuse leaves the battered woman with little confi-
dence or resolve. These factors, combined with the reality of having
147. Id. at 377.
148. See State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572, 578 (based on the court's perception of immi-
nence, as opposed to the defendant's perception of imminence, the court "objectively"
concluded that a battered woman cannot reasonably fear imminent life-threatening danger
from her sleeping spouse).
149. See Beckett v. People, 800 P.2d 74, 78 (Colo. 1990); People v. Jones, 675 P.2d 9,
13 (Colo. 1984).
150. 800 P.2d 74 (Colo. 1990).
151. Id. at 78.
152. Id. (quoting People v. Jones, 675 P.2d 9 (Colo. 1984)).
153. See Carol Lawson, Violence at Home: 'They Don't Want Anyone to Know', N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 6, 1992, at CI (reporting on the abuse of successful, educated women by their
equally successful husbands).
154. In many cases, the violence only escalates after a separation. "Violent men...
search desperately for their partners once [they] leav[e]" and it is this fear of reprisal or
death once the men find them that makes remaining with them preferable. BROWNE, supra
note 39, at 114-15. See EWING, supra note 12, at 12-21 (describing the realities of battered
women's lives that limit their ability to leave the batterer); Martin, supra note 65, at 72-86
(explaining why these women are often unable to leave the abusive relationship).
155. If she has ajob, it limits the geographic area available to her. If she does not have
a job, then her option of leaving is limited by her lack of financial resources.
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nowhere to go, tend to keep the woman in the abusive relationship.1 5 6
Finally, the court in State v. Kelly stated that "[o]nly by understand-
ing these unique pressures that force battered women to remain with
their mates, despite their long-standing and reasonable fear of severe
bodily harm and isolation that being a battered woman creates, can a
battered woman's state of mind be accurately and fairly understood."
15 7
This approach presents a much more realistic view of the life of these
women.
C. Battered Spouse Syndrome Testimony
People unaccustomed to the dynamics of a battering relationship,
including most jurors, cannot understand why a woman stays in an abu-
sive relationship.1 58 The complexities of a battered woman's life and
the reasons she remained in the marriage are "beyond the understand-
ing of an average juror."'15 9 Expert testimony is, therefore, essential to
a successful assertion of self-defense.1 60 Colorado Rule of Evidence
702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony.' 6 1 Colorado courts
have not discussed the admissibility of expert testimony on Battered
Spouse Syndrome under Rule 702. However, the Colorado Supreme
Court discussed the admissibility of expert testimony on Rape Trauma
Syndrome in People v. Hampton.' 62 The prosecution used testimony
about rape trauma syndrome to bolster the victim's credibility, a Similar
to testimony on the Battered Spouse Syndrome, this testimony does not
tell the jury the victim was actually raped because she fits the profile of a
rape trauma victim. Instead, it informs the jury the actions taken (or not
taken) by the defendant are consistent with those of the typical rape vic-
tim. 16 3 For example, if the victim does not report the crime immedi-
ately, the defense attorney will try to use that fact to attack the victim's
credibility. However, a delay in reporting the rape is consistent with
Rape Trauma Syndrome. Armed with such knowledge, the jury can bet-
ter ascertain the veracity of the victim's testimony.16
4
In Hampton, the supreme court announced that Colorado did not
follow the Frye test' 65 to determine the admissibility of expert testimony
156. Dr. Walker explains that the battered woman's options are limited by learned
helplessness. This helpless state evolves from the battered woman's belief that she cannot
control what happens to her. As a result, she believes that she can never influence or
change her situation and stops trying. WALKER, supra note 4, at 45-51. See also EWING,
supra note 12, at 20-21.
157. 478 A.2d 364, 372 (NJ. 1984).
158. See Shad, supra note 47, at 1165.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. COLO. R. EVID. 702.
162. 746 P.2d 947 (Colo. 1987).
163. Id. at 952-53.
164. Id. at 952.
165. The Frye test is a standard used forjudging the admissibility of expert testimony of
a scientific nature that originated prior to the adoption of the Colorado Rules of Evidence.
According to the Frye test, the technology must be accepted by a majority of the relevant
scientific community for the court to consider it reliable. Id. at 950 n.5.
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when the testimony involves psychological theories or models, as op-
posed to physical evidence (i.e., polygraph tests). The court held that
"expert testimony assists the jury within the meaning of [Colorado Rule
of Evidence] 702 because it is helpful to the jury in determining what
effect should be given to the victim's delay in reporting the crime."
166
Similar analysis would allow defendants to introduce expert testimony
on the Battered Spouse Syndrome. Although the Colorado appellate
courts have not ruled on the admissibility of expert testimony on the
Battered Spouse Syndrome, some trial courts allow it.
16 7
The opponents of admitting Battered Spouse Syndrome testimony
and tendering self-defense instructions believe that it will give women
free rein to kill their husbands. In fact, the North Carolina Supreme
Court decision in Norman expressed this fear. 168 The court stated that
"[t]he relaxed requirements for.., self-defense.., would tend to cate-
gorically legalize the opportune killing of abusive husbands by their
wives solely on the basis of the wives' testimony concerning their subjec-
tive speculation as to the probability of future felonious assaults by their
husbands."' 69 However, those same criticisms could be leveled against
any affirmative defense where the decision turns on the defendant's
word against the decedent's (i.e., heat of passion or traditional self-de-
fense). As with any affirmative defense, there is always the risk of error
favoring the defendant. But, the defendant cannot simply plead self-
defense without competent evidence to support her claim and expect to
be acquitted. 170 That is precisely why we use jury trials. Juries are to
determine the credibility of the defendant's witnesses and the reasona-
bleness of the defendant's belief that she was in danger. 17 1 The out-
right refusal to admit testimony of Battered Spouse Syndrome to
support the defendant's story or the refusal to tender a self-defense in-
struction to the jury is tantamount to depriving the defendant of a jury
trial-the court has determined that her version of the facts is
implausible.
For example, when the court in State v. Norman refused to acknowl-
edge the self-defense claim of a woman who killed her abuser during a
lull in the violence, it effectively imposed its perception of imminence on
the defendant. As noted above, perceptions of imminent danger vary
depending on situations and experiences. By imposing the court's per-
ception of danger on the defendant's actions, the court ignores the reali-
ties of the defendant's life with the batterer and holds the defendant to
an unrealistic standard of reasonableness. Only when courts allowjuries
to assess the reasonableness of the defendant's actions in light of her
166. Id. at 952.
167. Alan Katz, Reali Psychologist Vaffles on the Stand, DENVER POST, Mar. 29, 1992, at Cl
(Dr. Lenore Walker testified about the effects of the Battered Spouse Syndrome on Jen-
nifer Reali, a woman who claimed to be insane at the time she killed her lover's wife).
168. 378 S.E.2d 8, 15 (N.C. 1989).
169. Id.
170. See EwING, supra note 12, at 89-91 (explaining how burden of production and re-
quiring some competent evidence will reduce the number of spurious claims).
171. Byrd, supra note 52, at 189.
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situation at the time of the murder will self-defense attain gender-
neutrality.
Colorado adheres to the proposition that a defendant is entitled to
a jury instruction embodying her theory of the case if there is any evi-
dence to support it.172 This means that in order for the judge to in-
struct the jury on self-defense, the defendant must present credible
evidence that she acted in fear for her life. In fact, the Colorado
Supreme Court has held that failure to issue an instruction on self-de-
fense when the defendant offered evidence to show that he acted in self-
defense amounts to a usurpation of the jury's function. 173 Concrete evi-
dence in a battered-spouse case showing (1) the defendant suffered
years of physical, sexual and mental abuse, and (2) the batterer had
threatened to kill or severely beat her, is clearly "some evidence" that
the defendant acted in fear of death or great bodily harm. With that
evidence, the jury should decide whether her story is credible and
whether her belief was reasonable.
CONCLUSION
Intra-familial violence continues to be a major problem in the
United States. Statistics show that, in any given year, as many as six
million women will be beaten by boyfriends or husbands. 174 With the
prevalence of violence in our society, Colorado must inevitably decide
how its judiciary will treat battered women and whether its legal system
will inject equality into self-defense. The ultimate decision will speak
volumes about the status of women in the criminal justice system. Since,
punishing women who kill their abusers does not fit the commonly ac-
cepted justifications for imposing punishment and will impact the chil-
dren who witnessed the repeated violence, strong motivation exists for
encouraging Colorado courts to allow these women to employ the self-
defense doctrine.
Traditional self-defense focuses on one-time attacks or violent en-
counters between men. In order to successfully claim self-defense, a de-
fendant must prove that the actions were based on a real and reasonable
fear of imminent death or serious bodily harm. But this defense can
only be employed by battered women if courts choose to make the
ground rules gender-neutral. In order to progress towards gender-neu-
trality, juries should decide whether the battered defendant's belief was
reasonable based on evidence of the defendant's perceptions and fears.
Colorado's current self-defense statute and its rules of evidence should
172. People v. Banks, 804 P.2d 203, 206 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990) (explaining that "a
defendant is entitled to ... an instruction [on his theory of the case] no matter how im-
probable or unreasonable his theory may be, as long as the instruction is grounded on the
evidence.").
173. Young v. People, 107 P. 274, 276 (1910).
174. See EWING, supra note 12, at 95; see also Lara Gold, Women Who Leave Abusive Men
Sometimes Pay Lethal Pice, FORT MYERS NEWS-PRESS, Aug. 4, 1992 (indicating that current
projections indicate that nearly one-quarter of the women in the United States, more than
12 million, will be abused by a current or former partner at some time during their lives).
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allow these women to proffer self-defense instructions to the jury be-
cause (1) the defendant need only present some evidence to support her
theory of the case to receive the instruction and (2) the use of expert
testimony regarding Battered Spouse Syndrome provides that evidence.
Then, by judging these women in light of their history of abuse, the
traditional male-oriented concepts of reasonableness and imminence
will finally become gender-neutral standards which allow battered wo-
men to prevail on legitimate self-defense claims.
Joan L. Cordutsky
